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Abstract. The study of short-term projects to implement policy has lately gained ground among scholars 
of environmental governance and public administration. The increasing reliance on and prevalence of 
projects, or ‘projectification’, has spurred critical debates on the ability of projects to contribute to long-
term goals, including sustainability, as well as institutional change. Yet, the literature on projectification 
lacks specificity in terms of how projects are understood, how the relationship between projects and 
permanent organizations looks like, and how projects can influence institutional orders. The aim of this 
paper is to systematize the literature in order to uncover the process of transforming project outputs into 
institutional change. Three models of projectified governance – mechanistic, organic, and adaptive – is 
presented, providing a conceptual apparatus that advances the study of projects in environmental policy 
and governance. The paper argues that the adaptive model, with its reliance on multi-scalar networks 
for the coordination of project activities and knowledge, shows most promise in achieving institutional 
change to address complex environmental problems.  
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Introduction 
 
Many of the pressing problems in environmental governance are complex and ill-defined, 
which questions the usability of preexisting decision-making templates. To address these 
‘wicked problems’ (Brown, Harris, & Russell, 2010; Rittel & Webber, 1973), we need 
governance systems that are capable of absorbing new knowledge and crafting innovative 
solutions (Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005). Responding to climate change and 
biodiversity loss, for example, requires making structural changes to laws, norms, and social 
practices based on incomplete, and constantly evolving, knowledge. Additionally, to avoid the 
worst anticipated effects, these institutional changes need to occur rapidly (van der Leeuw, 
Wiek, Harlow, & Buizer, 2012). The tendency of institutions to resist change, however, slows 
down this process and presents significant challenges for addressing these complex challenges 
sufficiently (Munck af Rosenschöld, Rozema, & Frye-Levine, 2014). Confronting institutional 
rigidity, or inertia, by fostering attempts to modify existing institutions thus becomes a central 
priority for environmental governance. Yet, there is a clear need for a better understanding of 
the dynamics of institutional change in environmental governance (Beunen & Patterson, 2016).  
 
Projects present an interesting case for institutional change. A project can be defined as an 
organizational form bounded by time and resources, and populated by a project team 
performing assigned tasks for achieving change (Lundin & Söderholm, 1995). Projects are 
proposedly better equipped to manage the complexities, unpredictabilities, and rapid changes 
inherent in ‘late modern’ society (Andersson, 2009) and create more innovative solutions 
compared to permanent organizations, such as bureaucracies (Sahlin-Andersson & Söderholm, 
2002; Wolf, 2011). Studying projects to gain a better understanding of institutional change in 
the context of environmental governance shows promise.  
 
The popularity of utilizing projects to organize work has led to what scholars are calling 
projectification, or ‘an increasing reliance on temporary organisations, typically projects, in 
order to enhance action strategic effort’ (Godenhjelm, Lundin, & Sjöblom, 2015, p. 328) and a 
growth of project-infused discourse and techniques in society more broadly (Fred, 2018; 
Packendorff & Lindgren, 2014). Projects have long been a staple format for organizing work 
in the private sector and have therefore been the primary focus of project management research 
(see e.g. Lundin et al., 2015). For nearly a decade ago, the Journal of Environmental Policy and 
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Planning published a special issue devoted to exploring the role of projects and administrative 
short-termism in environmental governance (vol. 11, no. 3, 2009). Since then, projectification 
of the public sector has attracted an increasing amount of interest. Implementing policy through 
short-term projects remains a salient feature of public administration in developed countries, 
especially within the European Union (EU) (Büttner & Leopold, 2016; Godenhjelm et al., 2015; 
Sjöblom, 2009). For example, in Finland alone, between 2007 and 2013 some 18,000 projects 
were initiated as part of the Cohesion Policy. Studying projects and projectification in the public 
sector is in other words not merely a conceptual exercise, but has clear scholarly and political 
significance. 
 
In this paper, I explore the relationship between projectification, or projectified governance as 
I will call it, and institutional change in the context of environmental policy. The aim of the 
paper is to systematize the literature on projectified governance in order to uncover the 
processes of institutional change. Thus far, institutional change has been discussed in the 
literature in a variety of ways based on often ill-communicated assumptions about what a 
project is, how the relationship between projects and permanent organizations looks like, and 
how institutional change is supposed to occur in projectified governance arrangements. The 
contribution of the paper is that it addresses this lack of clarity by developing three models – 
mechanistic, organic, and adaptive projectified governance – that reveal the often-conflicting 
understandings of the process of institutional change. I argue that recognizing these distinct 
processes is crucial if we want to gain a more fine-grained understanding of how projects can 
instigate institutional change. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. I begin by discussing the importance and relevance of 
studying projectification and argue that adopting the concept of ‘projectified governance’ helps 
us to unpack the broader institutional and organizational environment in which projects are 
situated. By relying on institutional theory, I then develop a project-focused approach to 
complement existing debates on institutional change. Next, I present three models of 
projectified governance to portray different processes of institutional change and demonstrate 
their relevance by using examples from the existing literature. Finally, I discuss the implications 
of the models for the debate on projectified governance by contrasting them to different types 
of environmental problems.    
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The Foundations of Projectified Governance and Institutional Change 
 
Projectification mirrors different developments in policy and administrative practices. 
Godenhjelm et al. (2015) explain the growth of projectification in EU public policy by “push” 
and “pull” factors (see Godenhjelm et al. 2015 for a thorough discussion). Projectification was 
partly “pushed” by the economic downturn in the early 1990s and the subsequent calls for more 
flexible economic restructuring. Relatedly, administrative reforms in the 1980s associated with 
New Public Management demanded efficiency in policymaking and new non-bureaucratic 
ways of organizing work in the public sector. Later, New Public Governance spurred an interest 
in informal and temporary instruments (often borrowed from the private sector), including 
cross-sectoral partnerships and networks, supposedly allowing for experimentation and 
innovation in public administration. Another push factor is the EU Structural Funds that are 
ultimately implemented in individual projects through numerous programs. The pervasiveness 
of these projects and the adoption of an administrative infrastructure to manage these projects 
has formalized project-driven work in the EU across its member states (Fred, 2018). The pull 
factors include the growing political significance of sustainable development since the 1990s, 
where partnerships and projects are seen as apt for capacity-building and coordinating actions 
across sectors. Additionally, successful examples of projects in other sectors as well as 
migration of individuals to the public sector from other sectors has diffused project management 
ideals and practices to public administration. Thus, the increasing reliance on projects is 
strongly related to the developments in policy and administrative practice mentioned above. 
Nevertheless, projectification also presents a novel perspective, as it redirects our attention to 
the temporal dimension of these broader developments – more attention needs to be paid to the 
ways in which we coordinate work in temporary organizations and its implications for 
achieving public policy goals.  
 
The projectification literature is linked to multiple topical debates in environmental policy and 
governance (see also Munck af Rosenschöld & Wolf, 2017). Projectification is linked to the 
burgeoning literature on experiments in environmental governance (e.g. Turnheim, Kivimaa, & 
Berkhout, 2018; van der Heijden, 2015) as they both focus on small-scale interventions and see 
these as distinct from ordinary activities in permanent organizations. The major difference 
between the two literatures lies in their emphasis on projects as an organizational form – not all 
projects are experiments, but most policy-driven experiments are organized as projects (see 
Turnheim et al., 2018). Projectification is also relevant for governance literatures broadly 
5 
 
focusing on horizontal and vertical coordination across administrative departments, inclusion 
of stakeholders in decision-making, and questions of scale, including adaptive governance (e.g. 
Folke et al., 2005), joined-up government (e.g. Pollitt, 2003), multilevel governance (e.g. 
Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005), and collaborative governance (e.g. Bodin, 2017). Taken together, 
projectification presents an interesting case. In relation to the aforementioned literatures, it can 
be seen as a cross-cutting theme that highlights the temporary nature of many governance 
arrangements and, more broadly, directs our attention to the often overlooked concept of time 
in environmental governance (Munck af Rosenschöld & Wolf, 2017). Projectification presents 
a distinct focus on contemporary environmental governance by taking the role of temporally 
limited projects seriously in studying social action.  
 
From Projectification toward Projectified Governance 
 
Most studies conceptualize projectification as a process or development toward a higher 
number of projects as well as greater social, cultural, and political importance of projects. This 
development has been identified through a number of empirical studies focusing on Europe 
and, to a lesser extent, North America (e.g. Munck af Rosenschöld & Wolf, 2017) and Australia 
(Allan, 2012). It is important to recognize the fluidity of projectification; the development 
toward project-based work in the public sector has not been a linear or uniform progression 
across localities and regions. At the same time, as argued above, projects already have material 
implications for the implementation of policy and shape the organizational environments in 
which they are conducted (Fred, 2018). Building on the existing literature on projectification, 
and to emphasize the importance of projects in contemporary governance, I advance the (yet 
undefined) concept of ‘projectified governance’ (see Marsden, Sjöblom, Andersson, & Skerratt, 
2012; Munck af Rosenschöld & Wolf, 2017; Sjöblom & Andersson, 2016). I define projectified 
governance as: 
 
An arrangement constituted by organizations and individuals across sectors involved 
in temporary project-driven activities for the purpose of pursuing selected goals as well 
as the formal and informal institutions that guide these activities. 
 
The rationale for the usage of projectified governance is twofold. First, it emphasizes the 
salience of projects in contemporary governance. It is both from an organizational and 
discursive point of view a ‘substance’, not only a process, accompanied by bureaucratic 
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infrastructure, rules, norms, expectations, and political significance. It shifts the attention away 
from single projects toward studying the implications of an increasing reliance on projects in 
governance. Second, this conception also takes seriously the relationship between projects and 
the permanent organizations, such as public agencies and public project funders as well as the 
institutional environment of projectified governance (see Andersson, Sjöblom, Marsden, & 
Skerratt, 2012; Jensen, Johansson, & Löfström, 2017). This third point begs the question: if 
projects are bound by their institutional environments, how does this relationship look like and, 
in turn, how can projects influence institutions? In the next section, I will lay down the 
foundations for answering this question.  
 
Inducing Institutional Change through Projects 
 
Numerous studies have shown how projects are situated in broader institutional contexts that 
influence the functioning of the project (see e.g. Biesenthal, Clegg, Mahalingam, & Sankaran, 
2018; Engwall, 2003; Grabher, 2002). The argument is that by failing to take into account the 
institutional dimension, we fail to grasp a critical dimension of projects. Institutions have 
regulative, normative, and cognitive dimensions and are comprised of a set of relatively stable 
and commonly accepted rules, values, and schemas that guide actors’ behavior (Scott, 2008). 
Institutions can be either formal, such as codified rules and laws, or informal, including norms, 
routines, and social practices. In a projectified context, institutions can refer to the rules or 
norms that enable and constrain project activities, such as funding requirements and taken-for-
granted routines pertaining to managing projects. More broadly, they can also refer to framings 
of environmental problems as well as solutions and practices (see Beunen & Patterson, 2016), 
unrelated to the immediate management of projects.  
 
While stable, institutions do change. Institutional change can be treated as either continuous or 
discontinuous (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Continuous change is often conceptualized as 
incremental change, where the process is slower, more predictable, and linear. For example, 
projects may produce knowledge that is more or less in line with current understandings and do 
not question the broader institutional setting. Over time, however, the totality of these projects 
can give rise to institutional change. Discontinuous change involves a transformation, or 
punctuation of the equilibrium, that questions the deeper structures that inform rules, norms, 
and how things are perceived and occur in distinct ‘windows of opportunity’ (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 1993). Some projects, often called ‘institutional projects’ (Tukiainen & Granqvist, 
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2016), are purposely created to influence the institutional order, and involve key powerful 
actors and stakeholders that are able to alter the status-quo. These types of projects can achieve 
significant changes to the institutional order in a relatively shorter time span. As projectified 
governance is concerned with governance arrangements often built on a multitude of short-term 
projects (rather than a handful of high-profile institutional projects), the accumulating effect of 
project knowledge across time is crucial. We can therefore expect that institutional change is 
largely incremental, potentially followed by moments of discontinuous change.   
 
Institutional change can also be categorized as either exogenous or endogenous. Exogenous 
change results from changes in the broader environment, including the political, economic, and 
social dynamics, which open up new opportunities for alternative trajectories (see Mahoney & 
Thelen, 2010), such as economic depressions transforming entire sectors in society. 
Endogenous change, in turn, is a result of actions occurring within a governance arrangement, 
where actors shape and re-shape the institutional order. In institutional theory, endogenous 
change is often discussed with reference to ‘institutional work’ which refers to the actions that 
actors employ to create, maintain, and change institutional structures while at the same time 
being influenced by institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). The literature has focused on a 
wide variety of purposive and non-purposive actions (Beunen & Patterson, 2016) as well as 
strategies that actors employ to shape existing institutions or create new ones (for an overview, 
see Lawrence, Leca, & Zilber, 2013).  
 
Conceptualizing projects as arenas for institutional work has recently received some interest. 
As Lundin et al. (2015, p. 197) put it, ‘[i]nstitutional entrepreneurship or work, we argue, is by 
and large a project business’. A distinction can be made between studies that focus on the 
capacity of individual projects and the capacity of multiple projects for inducing endogenous 
change (Tukiainen & Granqvist, 2016). In a projectified setting, the focus lies on the interplay 
between multiple projects, on the one hand, and between multiple projects and permanent 
organizations, on the other. Here, institutional work is more concerned with the interaction 
between multiple actors, rather than the actions of individual change agents (see Beunen & 
Patterson, 2016). The key interest is in other words the processes occurring on the meso or 
governance level of analysis.  
 
The temporariness of projects has important implications for the study of institutional change. 
Knowledge generated in one particular project needs to be transferred to another project or a 
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permanent organization to be acted on, and ultimately, induce institutional change (Godenhjelm 
et al. 2015). Learning from project-generated knowledge is a necessary step in the broader 
process of achieving institutional change, as knowledge needs to be adapted to, or ‘translated’, 
to the novel context in which it is enacted (Manning & von Hagen, 2010). Exploring the means 
by which knowledge generated in projects is learned by other organizations thus becomes a key 
issue in studying institutional change (see Haunschild & Chandler, 2008). In the context of 
projectified governance, I suggest that:  
 
Institutional change is an outcome of learning from numerous project outputs, either 
planned or unexpected, giving rise to a revision of a set of rules, norms, cognitive 
frames, or social practices in one or multiple settings.  
 
It is worth noting that not all exercises of learning from project outputs lead to institutional 
change – some projects generate little or no additional knowledge that would advance altering 
existing rules or social practices. Other times, projects may produce valuable knowledge, but 
learning from them is not prioritized. Additionally, although this definition of institutional 
change is applicable to all projectified governance arrangements, the process of transforming 
project outputs into institutional change remains unclear. In the next section, I will explore this 
process more in detail.  
 
Three Models of Projectified Governance and Institutional Change 
 
Based on the existing literature on projectified governance, I develop three governance models 
that help us categorizing the different orientations and assumptions that projects embody as 
well as to uncover the processes of institutional change. Drawing on the work by Burns and 
Stalker (1961), Morgan (1997), and Scott and Davis (2007), I call these models ‘mechanistic’, 
‘organic’, and ‘adaptive projectified governance’. Specifically, they focus on 1) how projects 
are understood, 2) the link between projects and permanent organizations, and 3) how projects 
are supposed to change institutions. The choice of foci is derived from central concerns 
emerging in the existing literature. It is also worth noting that the idea is not to 
compartmentalize individual studies or researchers into particular models, but to highlight the 
different dimension of projectified governance using illustrating examples.  
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Mechanistic Projectified Governance 
 
The mechanistic model of projectified governance is based on the view that organizations have 
specific motives, and that ‘activities and interactions of participants are coordinated to achieve 
specified goals’ (Scott & Davis, 2007, p. 28). Projects work toward predetermined goals set out 
in the project plan and are seen to have the appropriate tools to monitor the progress of projects 
(Godenhjelm et al., 2015). Similarly, project participants have clearly defined roles and their 
responsibilities are commonly understood.  
 
In the mechanistic model, there is a clear, formalized structure by which projects operate. 
Projects have a strong link to broader political strategies, such as regional development 
strategies and agri-environmental programs, managed by permanent organizations, including 
funding bodies and public agencies (see Sjöblom & Andersson, 2016). The role of strategies is 
important, as they set out the main priorities to which projects are supposed to contribute. This 
means that ‘projects are not only task- and goal-oriented, but also (perhaps even primarily) 
politically and strategically oriented’ (Fred & Hall, 2017, p. 189). The aims and emphases in 
the strategy correspond to the rationalist notion that problems are ‘solvable’ through 
coordinated efforts, utilizing highly developed project management tools and guidelines 
(Andersson, 2009). The permanent organizations play a significant role in projectified 
governance, as they are responsible for managing the overall arrangement and overseeing 
projects to which they have provided funding (Hodge & Adams, 2016).  
 
The strong link between projects and permanent organizations is crucial for institutional 
change. Change is believed to be a result of a vertical transmission of knowledge from the 
temporary project to the permanent organization funding the project, where this knowledge is 
presumed to be sustained once the project finishes. As a result, project outputs are expected to 
influence the permanent organization and the rules and norms of political decision-making 
‘higher up’ in the projectified governance decision-making structure (Godenhjelm et al., 2015). 
However, if a project’s outputs are too deviant from what is expected or if they question the 
dominant institutional order of the permanent organization, there is a great risk that generated 
project results ‘remain isolated and will, like other foreign bodies, be rejected and become 
“islands in the stream”’ (Jensen et al., 2013, p. 135). Rather, projects ‘exploit’ (Brady & Davies, 
2004; see also Duit & Galaz, 2008) currently available knowledge, bounded by existing 
strategies. The role of projects in institutional change is thus to materialize the priorities and 
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objectives of political strategies, which consequently can result in broader institutional change. 
Change is however likely to be incremental, as projects do not question the fundamental 
structures of the status quo. 
 
The mechanistic model can be identified in a number of EU programs (Büttner & Leopold, 
2016), but also in agri-environmental policy in the United States (US). Munck af Rosenschöld 
and Wolf (2017) studied the recently initiated Regional Conservation Partnership Program, 
governed by the US Department of Agriculture. The program funds projects that implement a 
series of agricultural conservation practices on private lands. While the program emphasizes 
innovation and bottom-up activities on paper, the strong tradition of bureaucratic top-down 
steering limits the scope of projects by defining the eligible project practices a priori. The 
projects are thus bound by the limits set out by the permanent organization. From this 
perspective, institutional change is limited to implementing tried-and-tested practices in new 
geographical locations. This can lead to new activities being institutionalized in specific areas, 
and best practices from projects can be made available to permanent organizations, which, 
consequently, can alter rules for which practices are funded in the future.  
 
Taken together, this suggests that political strategies play a significant role in directing project 
activities. However, solely looking at the formal mechanisms of capturing results from projects 
paints an unnecessarily one-sided picture of the reality of project-based activities and their 
ability to induce institutional change. In the next section, I present a distinctively different 
perspective, which helps us extending our understanding of projects and institutional change.  
 
Organic Projectified Governance 
 
The organic model of projectified governance is based on the idea that organizations are similar 
to organisms inhabiting natural systems. This means that the formal goals and tasks of 
organizations, and the notion that organizations actually perform these tasks, is deemphasized 
for the benefit of embracing the sociality of organizations (Scott & Davis, 2007). In other words, 
there is, more often than not, a discrepancy between what the project is supposed to do and 
what the project, eventually, achieves. In addition, ‘what’ the project wants to achieve is 
contested among project participants, who construct their role in the project differently and may 
have diverging interests concerning the project (Godenhjelm, Munck af Rosenschöld, 
Kuokkanen, Andersson, & Sjöblom, 2012). Contrary to the mechanistic model, it has been 
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argued that ‘an unclear project goal is an intrinsic element of project management’ (Engwall, 
2002, p. 262).  
 
The ambiguity of project goals does not only relate to the dynamics of producing outputs. The 
expectations of projects may differ significantly among project participants and representatives 
from permanent organizations, which makes coordination of project activities highly 
challenging (Andersson, 2009). In organic projectified governance, the link between permanent 
organizations and projects is weak and based on minimal requirements regarding funding and 
broader contours of the project. Broader political strategies exist, but the strategies themselves 
are less specified and vague in terms of how expectations are supposed to be met by the projects. 
Thus, in contrast to the mechanistic model, the focus is on the actions of projects themselves, 
rather than on the ability of projects to implement pre-determined objectives imposed by the 
permanent organization.  
 
The organic model builds on the criticism toward the rationalistic ideals of vertical knowledge 
transfer of project-generated knowledge. Many studies question the capacity of the permanent 
organizations to learn from and utilize project results, pointing to lack of resources and 
knowledge on behalf of the permanent organization (Jensen et al., 2017; Marsden et al., 2012; 
Munck af Rosenschöld & Löyhkö, 2015; Sjöblom, Löfgren, & Godenhjelm, 2013). In his study 
of projects as part of EU’s Cohesion Policy, Vento (2017) argues that there is a mismatch 
between the formal evaluation tools, focusing on technical and economic performance, and the 
less easily measurable projects results of increased knowledge, innovation, and long-term 
outcomes. This has spurred discussions on alternative ways of conceptualizing project 
outcomes and impact. From an organic perspective, decentralizing the management of projects 
to various localities and contexts is at the core of projectified governance, as these constitute 
the arena where action is performed and its effect are largely felt. This gives projects more 
leeway to experiment and ‘explore’ new knowledge (Johansson, Löfström, & Ohlsson, 2007; 
see also Duit & Galaz, 2008).  
 
Compared to the mechanistic model, the main goal of projects is not to integrate or ‘recouple’ 
results to the permanent organization, but to appreciate the capacity of the projects themselves 
to generate change. Andersson (2009, p. 199) suggests that one way to do this is ‘to abandon 
the external requirement that projects must be innovative and instead simply let the innovative 
potential of project work in general play freely’. The bottom-up character of project-based work 
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can have real and material effects on the environment in which the project takes place 
(Andersson et al., 2012), including changes to practices and cognitive frames. Here, 
institutional change is an outcome of a horizontal process of accumulating knowledge across 
local projects. Importantly, in addition to influencing the context in which the projects operate, 
projects can also influence the actors involved in them (see Normann, 2015) – project 
knowledge becomes ‘embodied’ in participating actors and can be enacted and translated in a 
new context and project. In their report on the long-term outcomes of European Social Fund 
projects implemented in Sweden, Sävenstrand, Svensson, Holmström, Forssell and Fred (2012) 
stress the importance of an active project manager to ensure that knowledge is made use of 
across projects. During this process, new configurations of knowledge and ideas may emerge, 
which can form the basis for institutional changes, both intentional and non-intentional, in both 
expected and unexpected contexts.  
 
As an example of the organic model, Andersson (2009) comments on the Great Outdoors 
Colorado Program that provides opportunities for a wide range of actors to form partnerships 
to address various environmental problems. Interestingly, the content of the program is 
determined by the project applicants and their interests, making it sensitive to local needs and 
priorities. The program also provides multiple grants for one project, which can be seen to 
strengthen the role of projects in projectified governance. This stands in contrast to the majority 
of the cases that have been studied in the literature, and serves as an interesting counter-example 
to the mechanistic model. The organic model can also be distinguished in the earlier stages of 
the EU LEADER rural development program. Being a ‘laboratory’ (Ray, 2000) for developing 
new innovative ideas among local publics, companies, and local authorities, the program funds 
small-scale projects with significant local discretion as to which types of projects are favored. 
Later on, increasing bureaucratic control of the program has partly diminished its ‘anarchic 
element’ (Ray, 2000, p. 165), but the local capacity to decide on project funding persists.  
 
Exploring new knowledge across projects with diverging interests and scope serve as the basis 
for the organic model. In this line of reasoning, the implementation of project knowledge in the 
permanent organization that funded the project is deemphasized for the benefit of seeing 
institutional change as a result of local projects influencing their immediate local institutions, 
and, over time, potentially beyond. Due to the weak link between projects and permanent 
organizations, projects need to find alternative routes for putting project knowledge in motion 
and not rely on public authorities to act on project knowledge and induce broader institutional 
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change. This in turn can generate problems of coordination, as there is a risk that knowledge 
becomes fragmented without a designated body actively managing project activities (Sjöblom, 
2009).  In the third model of projectified governance, I contrast these points with the role of 
networks in shaping relationships and the process of institutional change.  
 
Adaptive Projectified Governance 
 
Many scholars have emphasized the need for considering social networks and how different 
relationships are structured when studying projects (e.g. Engwall, 2003; Grabher, 2004; Sydow, 
Schüssler, & Müller-Seitz, 2016). Networks have proven important also in the study of public 
sector projects (Godenhjelm et al., 2015; Jensen et al., 2013; Kuokkanen, 2013; Sjöblom & 
Andersson, 2016) and environmental governance more broadly (e.g. Bodin, 2017; Wolf, 2011). 
Focusing on cross-scale integration, the project is seen as ‘embedded’ (Manning, 2010) in 
project networks spanning across sectors and levels (DeFillippi & Sydow, 2016). While the 
projects themselves remain important, they are conceptualized in relation to broader networks.  
 
The adaptive features stems from the relationship between projects and permanent organization 
mediated by networks. Networks including actors from different sectors and on different levels 
play an important part in many forms of adaptive governance, thus providing an alternative to 
centralized and decentralized modes of governance (for an overview, see Folke et al., 2005). 
As projects are primarily parts of larger networks, the key question becomes how to govern 
these networks while retaining their core traits of autonomy (Jensen et al., 2013). 
Metagovernance, involving a ‘combination of hands-off tools such as institutional design and 
network framing and hands-on tools such as process management and direct participation’ 
(Sørensen & Torfing, 2011, p. 861), is the primary mode of managing projects. Political 
strategies managed by permanent organizations are, in other words, tools for steering, but not 
exhaustively defining the objectives and processes of projectified governance (see also Hodge 
& Adams, 2016).   
 
Whereas the organic model stresses the horizontal relationship between local projects as the 
main avenue of institutional change, the adaptive model focuses on the role of multi-level 
networks. In other words, institutional change can be seen as an interplay between horizontal 
and vertical processes. Once a project is terminated, the explorative knowledge produced in the 
project may (or may not) become contained within the broader network of which the project is 
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part of. The network itself consists of actors from various sectors in society, including actors 
from permanent organizations (see Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). Bearing in mind the 
embeddedness of projects (and project knowledge), the capacity to induce institutional change 
is determined by the ability of social networks to exploit project outputs and create new 
trajectories (see also Duit & Galaz, 2008). Grabher (2004) notes that networks with recurring 
interactions between a fixed set of actors generally leads to more ‘cumulative’ forms of 
knowledge production, whereas networks that rearrange interactions tend to promote more 
discontinuous forms of learning. Networks generally have both cumulative and discontinuous 
traits, which suggests that projects are both exploitative and explorative in adaptive projectified 
governance. The process of horizontal diffusion is similar to the one in the organic model, but 
the main differences lie in the role of networks spanning across sectors and organizations in 
capturing, retaining, and acting on project knowledge, and in the monitoring and steering of 
self-organizing networks by permanent organizations by metagovernance.  
 
Adaptive projectified governance can be illustrated by a couple of empirical examples. In their 
study of 275 innovation projects funded by the European Regional Development Fund in 
Finland, Godenhjelm and Johanson (2018) explore the innovative potential of projects and their 
relationship to networks. They cast doubt on the ability of public project funders to detect links 
between projects that would sustain project knowledge across projects and emphasize that the 
networks in which project participants operate play a prime role in ensuring that the new 
knowledge projects produce is put into motion. They also stress the importance of enabling 
public sector actors to participate in project networks, especially if permanent organizations are 
supposed to make use of the knowledge that the projects produce. Larsson and Waldenström 
(2012) arrive at a similar conclusion in their study of the LEADER program in Sweden. Local 
networks consisting of businesses, local associations, local citizens, and local funding bodies 
have the ability to retain the knowledge produced in individual LEADER projects and serve as 
the arena for capacity building across projects. Based on LEADER projects in Hungary, 
Megyesi (2012) shows that project networks that are able to foster bonds among local actors 
and, further, to permanent organizations induce more activity and flexibility. This has arguably 
important implications for sharing project knowledge across scales.  
 
These examples show that projects and networks are closely linked, and that that networks 
constitute important venues of coordinating project activities. Instead of focusing on the 
relationship between projects and permanent organization (mechanistic model) or between 
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projects themselves (organic model), the adaptive model shows that institutional change is an 
outcome from continuous dialogue between projects and networks. Networks operate as 
repositories of accumulated project knowledge and as arenas for acting on that knowledge in 
projectified arrangements, which serves as the basis for inducing institutional change.  
 
Concluding Discussion 
 
The literature on projectified governance in the public sector has flourished during the last 
decade or so. In this paper, I have highlighted the many dimension of organizing work in 
projects, which have important implications for environmental governance. As a starting point, 
I noted that confronting institutional inertia by fostering attempts to modify existing institutions 
is a central priority for environmental governance. The goal of this paper was to systematize 
the literature on projectified governance in order to uncover the processes of institutional 
change induced by projects. This was done by developing three models of projectified 
governance – mechanistic, organic, and adaptive – that uncover these often ill-defined 
processes. Recognizing these processes and their differences is critical in order to gain a better 
understanding of projects and institutional change. They embrace different conceptions of the 
role of projects and permanent organizations as well as of the ‘manageability’ of projectified 
governance, which guide the study of projects and institutional change (see Table 1 for an 
overview).  
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
In contemporary environmental governance, discussions on ‘tame’ and ‘wicked’ problems 
(Brown et al., 2010; Rittel & Webber, 1973) has led to critical assessments of the 
appropriateness of conventional hierarchical and linear planning in dealing with many 
sustainability challenges. To this end, projects present an important case. The mechanistic 
model is well suited for simple or tame problems that are well defined and where the solution 
is known. The model is particularly apt in diffusing tried-and-tested technologies to locations 
where little adaptation is required. Providing extensive leeway in project formulation and 
implementation is counterproductive, as the ‘recipe’ already exists and flexibility may cause 
projects going astray from the predetermined path. Unsuspectedly, the mechanistic model is 
suited for many engineering projects, such as strengthening dikes to protect against flooding or 
installing energy-saving technologies. The prospects of institutional change are limited to 
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incremental amendments institutions in an effort to optimize project outcomes. The mechanistic 
model has received a fair share of criticism, not least from the perspective of tackling more 
intricate problems (e.g. Allan, 2012). To address these, alternative ways of organizing projects 
need to be adopted. 
 
The organic model is arguably better equipped to take on ‘complicated’ problems. These 
problems ‘contain subsets of simple problems but are not merely reducible to them’ 
(Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002, p. 1), which requires cooperation and coordination across 
sectors and forms of expertise. The organic model emphasizes the agency of localities and non-
governmental actors in formulating project plans and in executing them. The strength of the 
model is that it allows localities to translate and adapt the project according their setting, and it 
is useful in situations where the problem is deeply rooted in local contexts. The major drawback 
of the organic model is that project activities become impossible to coordinate on the supra-
local level, as they are comparably less confined by broader political strategies managed by 
permanent organizations. For multi-scalar problems that stretch across localities and beyond, 
this is troublesome, as these problems require continuous institutional adaptation across 
governance levels in light of new knowledge.  
 
The adaptive model mitigates much of these challenges of scale and shows most promise in 
dealing with non-linear ‘complex’ multi-level environmental problems with numerous 
interdependencies (Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002), perhaps best exemplified by climate 
change. The reliance on cross-sectoral networks ensures continuous feedback and flow between 
individual projects and broader networks, making it more open to exploration and exploitation 
of project activities and knowledge across multiple scales (see also Duit & Galaz, 2008). At the 
same time, it emphasizes that projects need not only give rise to institutional change through 
formal means via bureaucracies but can exert influence in various ways. Through involvement 
of other local and regional actors, the knowledge produced in projects travel diagonally across 
project actors, sectors, and scales, which can give rise to changes in multiple settings. Studying 
more carefully the processes of institutional change empirically would require longitudinal or 
historical methodologies, which would provide a more comprehensive account of how 
knowledge created in projects becomes/became embedded in various social contexts and 
networks and how it influences/influenced them. These networks need to be studied critically, 
and focusing on how the network is composed and whose interests are being favored will be 
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necessary (Wolf, 2011). This is admittedly no easy task, but a necessary one if we want to 
advance a fuller understanding of projectified governance and institutional change. 
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Table 1. Three models of projectified governance.  
 
 Mechanistic 
projectified 
governance 
Organic 
projectified 
governance 
Adaptive 
projectified 
governance 
Problem type  Simple Complicated Complex 
Focal relationship of 
interest 
Permanent 
organization–
projects 
Project–project Projects–networks 
Primary form of 
learning 
Exploitation  Exploration Exploitation of 
exploratory 
knowledge 
Process of 
institutional change 
Vertical transfer of 
project knowledge to 
higher levels of 
decision-making 
Horizontal transfer 
of project knowledge 
to new areas and 
contexts 
Horizontal transfer 
of project knowledge 
with vertical 
monitoring of 
project activities 
Promises  Efficiency through 
coordination; plan-
ability 
Flexibility through 
local adaptation; 
social robustness 
Flexibility and 
coordination 
Challenges Rigidity Hard to control 
 
Balancing between 
exploitation and 
exploration 
 
 
 
